Behavioral Phenotypes in Evolutionary Games on Networks

Evolutionary Game Theory simulates collective behaviors to explain the emergence of cooperation from self-interest decisions. Our aim in this thesis is to analyze if uniformity and moderation into the payoff matrices drives to the emergence of higher solidarity, as we have insistently been said by monotheisms, nationalisms and ideologies commissioners; or either diversity, multiculturalism, persistent discussions, even polarized, about the variability in “value scales”, about the different point of views and perspectives, as in modern democratic societies, improves the emergence of altruism.
To do so, we will simulate collectives as networks of individuals playing evolutionary games, where they can choose to collaborate or defect, under different parametrizations of the payoff matrices, in addition, to see if diversity of criteria, drives to the emergence of higher collaboration rates in the systems, we include in our numerical model different behavioral phenotypes observed in experiments with human subjects. We conclude as a clear trend that single thought, homogeneity in values and point of views, border lines and closeness, brings normalized societies to lower altruism levels.