Affective polarization, defined as a widespread tendency to distrust and dislike people from opposing parties or ideologies, has risen sharply in many liberal democracies (Iyengar et al., 2019). It is driven by a stark division between the in-group—members of one’s own partisan or ideological community—and the out-group, perceived as a threat due to differing social or political identities. Numerous studies have examined the different forms affective polarization takes depending on the democratic system, how it should be measured, and its impact on democratic governance. We focus on affective polarization in the UK, where it has emerged as a result of new identities formed during the Brexit referendum campaign (Hobolt et al., 2021). We investigate how winning or losing the referendum affects affective polarization, drawing on literature about the “winner-loser gap” in democratic elections. Our analysis, using the British Election Study panel dataset (Waves 14-15) and OLS and multinomial regression models, demonstrates that extreme dissatisfaction with the referendum outcome and a refusal to accept it increase the likelihood of being affectively polarized. Similarly, extreme satisfaction and unwillingness to compromise with the losing side also raise the likelihood of affective polarization. This suggests that winners and losers are not homogenous groups, and their distinct attitudes play a significant role in shaping affective polarization.
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