Stochastic games on complex networks: study on a Prisoner's Dilemma and a Public Good Game
Sergio Lacasta López (Supervisor: Sandro Meloni)
Master Thesis (2019)
Two are the main features that define the evolution of cooperation in a game: the structure of the system and the imitation-rule employed. Here, we first make a review of the Prisoner’s Dilemma and the Public Good Game for different structures and imitation-rules, comparing results with the case of a Well Mixed Population in order to get a general idea of them. Then we introduce the idea of Stochastic Games, games with two different payoff matrix combined in a stochastic way that in our case will be with an environmental feedback, obtaining new results for both games and exploring large regions of parameters and initial conditions. Moreover, we will also compare them with the case of aWell Mixed Population so as to study the influence of structured networks.