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An impure public good model with lotteries in large groups

  • Talk

  • Haydee Lugo
  • Dept. de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico, Universidad Complutense de Madrid
  • May 13, 2011, noon
  • IFISC Seminar Room
  • Announcement file
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We analyze the effect of a large group on an impure public goods model
with lotteries.

We show that as populations get large, and with selfish preferences, the
level of contributions

converges to the one given by voluntary contributions. With altruistic
preferences (of the warm glow

type), the contributions converge to a level strictly higher than those
given by voluntary contributions,

even though in general they do not yield first-best levels.


Contact details:

Ernesto M. Nicola

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