Postdoctoral Researcher en Institut du Cerveau – Paris Brain Institute Ivry-sur-Seine - France
In today's economy, selling a new zero-marginal cost product is a real challenge, as it is difficult to determine a product's ”correct” sales price based on its profit and dissemination. As an example, consider the price of a new app or video game. There is a growing need to design innovative sales mechanisms for such products. In this talk we will introduce an auction model in which buyers continuously place bids and the challenge is to decide whether to accept them or not. The model has no deadline for bidding, and exhibits self-organized criticality; it presents a critical price from which a bid is accepted with probability one, and avalanches of sales above this value are observed. This SOC model also has the peculiarity of being mathematically tractable. In this presentation, we will present some of the results.
Presential in the seminar room. Zoom link:
https://zoom.us/j/98286706234?pwd=bm1JUFVYcTJkaVl1VU55L0FiWDRIUT09
Detalls de contacte:
Jose Javier Ramasco Contact form