Exploration dynamics in evolutionary games

Most models based on evolutionary game theory stress imitation and do not consider other issues affecting strategy spreading, such as errors in reproduction or intelligent decision making in social systems. As a first approximation, these effects can be captured by random strategy choice. In genetic settings, this corresponds to mutations in the DNA, whereas in cultural evolution, it describes individuals deviating from the usual imitation. Genetic mutations typically occur with very small probabilities, but testing the available strategies in behavioral experiments is common. We term this phenomenon ‘‘exploration dynamics’’ to contrast it with the traditional focus on imitation. As an illustrative example of the emerging evolutionary dynamics, we consider a public goods game with cooperators and defectors and add punishers and the option to abstain from the enterprise in further scenarios. For small mutation rates, cooperation (and punishment) is possible only if interactions are voluntary, whereas moderate mutation rates can lead to high levels of cooperation even in compulsory public goods games.

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